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Article
STADIUM FINANCING: WHERE WE ARE, HOW WE GOT
HERE, AND WHERE WE ARE GOING
FRANK A. MAYER, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, cities and private investors have constructed
new sports stadiums across the country in record numbers. Since
the year 2000, local governments and investors have combined to
build twenty-one new stadiums for the National Football League
("NFL"), National Basketball Association ("NBA"), Major League
Baseball ("MLB"), and National Hockey Association ("NHL"). 1
Several analysts argue that the rapid changes in design and availa-
ble amenities over the last decade have rendered any stadium over
ten years old economically obsolete.
2
* Frank A. Mayer, III, Esq. is a Partner and Vice Chair of the business depart-
ment at the Philadelphia law firm of Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads,
LLP. He is the former Corporate Chair of the City of Philadelphia Law Depart-
ment and represented the City of Philadelphia with respect to the financing and
construction of new stadiums recently built for both the Philadelphia Eagles and
Philadelphia Phillies. The author would like to acknowledge and thank contribu-
tions of both Christopher M. Barr, Esq. (Of Counsel to Montgomery McCracken
Walker & Rhoads, LLP) and Craig Gargano (Summer Associate with Montgomery
McCracken Walker & Rhoads, LLP), whose contributions were integral to the pro-
duction of this article.
1. These stadiums include: Paul Brown Stadium, Cincinnati (2000); Nation-
wide Arena, Columbus (2000); Commercial Park, Detroit (2000); Enron Field,
Houston (2000); Minute Maid Park, Houston (2000); Pacific Bell Park, San Fran-
cisco (2000); Xcel Arena, St. Paul (2000); American Airlines Arena, Dallas (2001);
Invesco Stadium at Mile High, Denver (2001); Miller Park, Milwaukee (2001);
Heinz Field, Pittsburgh (2001); PNC Park, Pittsburgh (2001); Ford Field, Detroit
(2002); Gillette Stadium, Foxborough (2002); Reliant Stadium, Houston (2002);
SBC Arena, San Antonio (2002); Seahawks Stadium, Seattle (2002); Great Aneri-
can Ballpark, Cleveland (2003); Lincoln Financial Field, Philadelphia (2003); Citi-
zens Bank Park, Philadelphia (2004); Petco Park, San Diego (2004). List compiled
by and on file with author.
2. See Tom Powell, Influx Of New Stadiums, Arenas Will Continue Past 2000:
Lonergan, AMUSEMENT Bus., Aug. 18, 1997, at 12 [hereinafter Influx of Stadiums]
(analyzing design and amenity changes in stadiums).
(195)
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By the year 2009, the New YorkJets hope to continue this trend
with their plan to build a new stadium on Manhattan's West Side. 3
The stadium's goal is to generate record-breaking revenue streams
through naming rights, corporate sponsorships, suite sales, and
club-seat sales.4 While the organization anticipates receiving sub-
stantial profits from the new stadium, it still must figure out a way to
finance the estimated $1.4 billion cost.5 To this end, the organiza-
tion is currently negotiating with several private lending institu-
tions, including Salomon Smith Barney and Lehman Brothers, in
order to borrow $600 million to fund the new stadium. 6 City and
state officials have pledged another $600 million, leaving the team
to cover the remaining $200 million.7 No one has ever attempted a
financing plan on this scale in the history of stadium construction.8
The cost, however, may be even higher than $1.4 billion in the
end due to the bidding war that erupted between the Jets and the
owner of Madison Square Garden (Cablevision) over the land upon
which the Jets propose to build the stadium.9 In order to secure
the land, the Jets were forced to raise their initial offer from $100
million to $720 million. 10 The team's demands on New York City
and its fans to fund the stadium and the possible ramifications such
financial support might have on the community have brought the
debate over public financing of a sports stadium to the forefront. I I
Since the nineteenth century, stadiums have been built with
complete public financing, complete private funding, or more typi-
cally, by some combination of both private and public money.12
3. See Daniel Kaplan, Jets seek loan of up to $600M, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
Bus. J., Apr. 12, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Jets Seek Loan] (discussingJets plan to build
new stadium).
4. See id. (stating Jets organization predicts revenue from naming rights of
new stadium would be at least third most lucrative naming deal of all time, follow-
ing Reliant Stadium and FedEx Field).
5. See id. (noting new stadium would be costliest U.S. stadium built).
6. See id. (describing loan arrangements).
7. See id. at 25.
8. See Jets Seek Loan, supra note 3, at 25 (indicating scale of financing plan).
9. See Charles V. Bagli & Sewell Chan, M. T.A. Expected to Back Jets' bid to Build
Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at Al (noting Cablevision submitted bid of
$760 million).
10. See id.
11. See id. (explaining how New York citizens' concerns range from increased
traffic congestion and limited parking, to increased rates or taxes to cover city's
portion of money needed to build stadium).
12. See MARTIN J. GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 187 (2ed. 2000) (contrast-
ing Ravens Stadium's approximated $200 million cost funded predominantly
through bonds and lottery proceeds while private bank loans and extensive spon-
sorship deal funded PacBell Park).
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While municipal governments' decisions to fund these projects
have always been questioned, people did not begin to raise serious
arguments over the use of public money to support construction of
sports stadiums until the 1960s. 13 These arguments prompted the
federal government to push local governments to increase the pri-
vate funding used in these ventures. 14 New York's plan of mixed
private and public funding for stadium development represents the
modem approach to financing a new sports stadium.1 5
Even with these changes to stadium financing, many critics still
argue against the use of public money to build stadiums, because
they assert that stadiums will not benefit the community as a
whole.16 The purpose of this Article is to compare the arguments
for and against public and private financing. The Article estab-
lishes that while the critiques of public financing have merit, private
financing is also problematic. The Article's goal is to demonstrate
that while neither structure alone presents a feasible option, the
combination of the two provides a potentially workable solution.
To develop this argument, Section II discusses the causes of
the recent boom in construction of new stadiums. Section III pro-
vides a brief history of the development of financing for stadiums
since the nineteenth century. Section IV examines the benefits and
sacrifices associated with both public and private financing mecha-
nisms. Section V expands on the major pitfalls of private financing
through a case study of Oregon Arena Corporation's recent bank-
ruptcy declaration. Finally, Section VI argues that the current sys-
tem of mixing public and private financing should remain intact.
II. RATIONALE FOR THE INCREASE IN STADIUM CONSTRUCTION
Stadium owners and municipal governments are often willing
to risk upsetting certain members of the public by building new
stadiums because of the possible revenues a new sports stadium can
13. See Andrew H. Goodman, Article, The Public Financing of Professional Sports
Stadiums: Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAw. J. 173, 180-81 (2002) (discussing how
government subsidies for stadium construction were not concern in first half of
twentieth century).
14. The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, and 1986 Tax Reform Act all served to reduce the ability of the local
government to provide tax-exempt bond funding for public facilities. See id. at 176
(noting 1986 Tax Code is pivotal legislation).
15. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 150-51 (discussing different eras of sta-
dium financing).
16. See Todd Senkiewicz, Comment, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should
Pay?, 8 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 575, 589 (1998) (explaining building stadiums does
not increase revenue within community as much as initially thought).
2005]
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produce. 17 Numerous factors account for the increased revenues a
new stadium can generate, however, the majority of the increase in
revenues are realized through improved stadium revenue-produc-
ing engines. 18 Another typical reason for construction is the pres-
sure teams can place on a city to build a new stadium, either by
citing the need for a single sport complex or threatening to move
to a new location. 19
A. Stadium Revenue-Generating Engines
Numerous amenities inside new stadiums produce income for
the team and facility owner.20 With each new stadium that is built,
designers develop new methods for generating income, often trans-
forming every facet of the building into a revenue producer. The
increased income that teams reap from new revenue generating
concepts provides the incentive for stadium and team owners to
lobby for new stadiums that contain these most recent generators.2'
These revenue generators have become particularly important for
teams in smaller markets in leagues that do not share revenue.22
Without highly developed revenue generators, these "small market"
teams are unable to compete financially with teams that receive
more lucrative media contracts. Several of these revenue producers
are discussed below.
1. Advertising
While advertising has been a part of professional sports for a
long time, new technology and creative ad placements have taken
the relationship between the two to a higher level.2 3 As sports
teams increase the percentage of advertising revenue they retain,
17. See id. at 588 (noting sports and entertainment is fastest growing
industry).
18. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial
but Permissible... Time for Federal Income Tax Relieffor State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA.
SPORTS & ETr. LJ. 135, 144-45 (2002) (listing sale and advertising of naming rights
as predominant reason for increase).
19. See id. at 145-46 (discussing threat of moving teams to urban locations and
stressing need for single sport complex).
20. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 271 (listing new and old revenue
producers).
21. See id. at 271, 299 (noting naming rights as most lucrative revenue
producer).
22. See id. at 334 (discussing how advertising is exempt from league revenue
sharing in NFL, thus making it very profitable, especially considering advertising
can generate up to six million dollars in annual revenue).
23. See id. at 334-35 (recognizing demand for advertising).
[Vol. 12: p. 195
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the incentive to increase advertising grows. 24 The ability to increase
these profit streams can have a huge impact on the decision to
build a new stadium. 25 New stadiums typically contain many differ-
ent opportunities for advertising, several of which are discussed
below.
The first kind of advertisement is signage. Signage is the ge-
neric term used to describe any posters or placards placed around
the stadium. New stadiums use technology to maximize the returns
on such signage. 26 For example, stadiums now contain Dorna
Boards, which allow stadiums to place long signs that rotate adver-
tisements. 27 Each board can hold approximately twenty-eight sepa-
rate advertisements. 28  Other technological improvements in
signage include Adsleeves, which cover entryway turn-styles, Glow-
Benches, which are rotating advertisements on the back of the
benches in stadiums, and "Stall Tactics," which are advertisements
inside of bathroom stalls.29 These signs can cost advertisers be-
tween several thousand and several hundred thousand dollars per
sign depending on the amount of camera time or fan viewing the
sign will receive. 30
Sponsorship provides another common form of popular adver-
tising. In a sponsorship deal, "a sponsor may obtain the right to
display its name or logo on team uniforms or other clothing, name
a stadium or arena, or offer promotions, like fan contests held as
part of a game."3 1 While these packages vary in construction, they
can add millions of dollars each year to revenues produced by the
stadium. 32
24. See id. (describing numerous revenue producers of advertising industry).
25. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 334 (describing how two professional
sports teams, Washington Wizards and Washington Redskins, experienced tremen-
dous increases in advertising revenues). The NBA's Washington Wizards saw a 100
percent increase in their advertising returns when they built a new stadium, and
the NFL's Washington Redskins were able to increase their advertising revenue
from around $250,000 to between $6 and $8 million. Id.
26. See id. at 337 (explaining innovative ways to display signs and get them in
front of as many consumers as possible).
27. See id. (noting Dorna Boards as most prevalent in basketball games).
28. See id. ("Each 80-foot-long Dorna Board can rotate as many as 28 separate
advertisements through the same space during the game.").
29. See id. (illustrating various cost-effective methods of advertising).
30. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 335 (explaining how return on advertis-
ing depends on camera time).
31. Id. at 338.
32. See id. at 340 (stating how sponsorship agreements at San Francisco's Pa-
cific Bell Park total over $60 million).
20051
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Stadium pouring rights and virtual advertising are two addi-
tional, smaller sources of revenue for a stadium. Stadium pouring
rights grant a beverage company exclusive rights to sell its bever-
ages in the team's home stadium.3 3 Presently, Coca-Cola Co. has a
dominant share of the pouring rights for stadiums in the four ma-
jor sports.3 4 Virtual advertising uses "computer-generated ads elec-
tronically placed on otherwise blank walls, fences and playing
surfaces" that can only be seen by TV viewers.35 This type of adver-
tisement has advantages over other forms because it maximizes lim-
ited space by changing every few minutes and can be transmitted
simultaneously into different countries appearing in each country's
native language.3 6
2. Naming Rights
Stadium naming rights first appeared in 1987 when the Los
Angeles Forum was renamed the Great Western Forum.3 7 Since
that time, naming rights have become one of the most lucrative
revenue generating aspects of a new stadium. 38 The NFL Houston
Texans currently have the largest naming deal in their partnership
with Reliant Energy Inc., which will generate $300 million over the
next thirty years.3 9 Today, many naming right agreements go be-
yond the name of the stadium itself. Certain packages also include
the naming rights to the entryways, the field, or the breezeways. 40
Other types of packages may include partial team ownership, 41 an
33. See id. at 342 (claiming pouring rights are new but evolving into one of
professional sports' most competitive markets).
34. See id. at 343 (noting Coke has pouring rights for 22 MLB teams, 24 NFL
teams, 24 NBA teams, and 21 NHL teams).
35. GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 344.
36. See id. (explaining how Japanese viewers see advertisements in Japanese
while, simultaneously, American viewers see same ads in English).
37. See id. at 299 (describing while other stadiums had been named after geo-
graphic regions, renowned individuals, or home teams, Great Western Forum was
first to be named after a corporation itself, and thus began new era of corporate
sponsorship).
38. See id. (stating naming rights have become most lucrative revenue
generator).
39. See id. at 303 (describing Houston Texans' naming deal).
40. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 299 (demonstrating how NFL Cleveland
Browns decided only to sell naming rights to auxiliary areas, including two stadium
portals).
41. See id. at 310 (showing how Adolph Coors Brewing Company received
naming rights, signage rights, and ownership stake in franchise as part of its deal
with Colorado Rockies).
[Vol. 12: p. 195
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agreement to use naming revenue to pay off financing for the sta-
dium, 42 or as a part of a larger sponsorship agreement. 43
The cost of naming rights depends on a number of factors.
The leading factor is the presence of an established sports
franchise, without which most investors would lose interest in the
stadium. 44 Corporate sponsors also consider the total number of
major events the stadium will host in a given year, including sport-
ing events and any other special events that the stadium may at-
tract.45 A third factor that contributes to the price of a naming deal
involves the number of corporations located in the general vicinity
of the proposed site of the facility. 46 Once the naming right terms
are established, the proceeds from the deal are often divided be-
tween the team and the facility owner.47
3. Club Seats
Club seats generally are defined as sections of individual sta-
dium seating which may contain enhanced amenities, including ex-
tra-wide and comfortable seats, exclusive lounges, and wait staff to
handle section concessionary needs. 48 The Miami Dolphins were
the first to use club seating to increase a stadium's income.49 Since
that time, club seats have become increasingly popular, growing by
over 500% since the early 1990s. 50 By the year 2000, prices for indi-
vidual season club seats ranged from slightly under $1,000 to ap-
proximately $15,000, depending both on the sport and the
stadium. 51
42. See id. (stating Fleet Financial Services received naming rights for home of
NHL Boston Bruins and NBA Boston Celtics by reducing borrowing amount neces-
sary to build stadium).
43. See id. at 309 (noting Phillips and Time Warner received naming rights as
well as opportunity to develop entire media system of Phillips Arena in Atlanta).
44. See id. at 313-14 (explaining how investors would lose interest in stadium).
45. Events such as the Superbowl, NCAA Final Four, or other major tourist
attractions that increase the visibility of the corporation increase the amount of
money the corporation is willing to spend in sponsoring the stadium. See GREEN-
BERG, supra note 12, at 314.
46. See id. (explaining how increasing corporate entities in particular vicinity
would increase probability of selling naming rights).
47. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (describing details and op-
tions for dividing club seat revenues).
48. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 271 (illustrating amenities received by
club seat patrons).
49. See id. (describing former Miami Dolphins owner, Joe Robbie, as pioneer/
inventor of club seating).
50. See id. (noting growth of club seats has produced "a significant and steady
revenue stream for the four major league professional sports teams").
51. See id. at 274 (listing prices of club seats for major league teams). The
NFL Tennessee Titans' club seats sell for $750 - $2,495 per season, while the NBA
2005]
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Today, stadium owners use anticipated revenues generated by
club seats to guarantee loans, bonds, or any other financing
method they employ to build a new facility. 52 Once the stadium is
constructed, the club seat profits are divided between the team and
arena owner in a number of different ways. Possible divisions for
club seat revenue include a flat percentage provision, 53 a scaled
percentage-based sharing scheme, 54 a flat fee to the lessor, 55 or to-
tal retention by the team. 56
4. Personal Seat Licenses
Personal Seat Licenses ("PSLs") are fees paid by individuals to
guarantee the individual a right to purchase season tickets in a
specified location for a designated period of time. 57 These license
fees can range from $250 to $16,000 depending on the sport and
team. 58 Certain seat licenses apply only to the sport for which they
were sold and not to any other special events that might take place
in the stadium. 59 Typically, PSLs have limitations on the transfera-
bility of the license and the economic benefit that can be received
by selling the license.60
PSLs help address one of the main criticisms of public financ-
ing for stadiums. Much of the debate over sports stadium financing
has centered on the need to target more of the spending to those
Los Angeles Lakers' club seats sell for $12,995 - $15,000 per season and include
admission to NBA Los Angeles Clippers and NHL Los Angeles Kings games. Id.
52. See id. at 271 (stating Robbie used club seats to secure facility's finances).
53. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 277 (stating process involves stadium
owners taking specific percentage of net proceeds from club seats). For example,
the MLB Arizona Diamondbacks pay Maricopa County Sports District five percent
of their gross proceeds from club seating. Id.
54. See id. (demonstrating how scaled percentage-based sharing allows sta-
dium owners to take progressively larger percentages of club seat revenue as net
proceeds increase). For example, the NHL Anaheim Mighty Ducks' lease agree-
ment with the Odgen Facility Management Corporation of Anaheim provides that
the Mighty Ducks' shall retain forty-five percent of the first $10 million, fifty per-
cent of the next $10 million, fifty-five percent of the next $10 million, and fifty
percent of all remaining revenues produced from club seats. Id.
55. See id. at 279 (describing flat fee process as paying set amount for use of
stadium). For example, NFL Tampa Bay Buccaneers pay Tampa Bay Sports Au-
thority $3.5 million annually from gross club seat profits. Id.
56. See id. at 278 (stating NFL Baltimore Ravens retain all revenues received
from club seat sales).
57. See id. at 293 (defining PSLs as contractual agreements between team and
purchaser to purchase season tickets for set period of time).
58. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 294 (noting NFL Baltimore Ravens' PSLs
cost $250, while NFL Oakland Raiders' PSLs cost $16,000).
59. See id. (explaining how PSL does not guarantee license for concerts).
60. See id. (describing PSLs as licenses and not as real property interests in
stadiums).
[Vol. 12: p. 195
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who actually benefit from the stadium. Aside from luxury seating,
there are very few ways to tap the users for more money. PSLs
transfer cost to those who use the stadium most often. 61 The NFL
Carolina Panthers employed this theory in the construction of their
new stadium.62 The Panthers' effective use of PSLs almost com-
pletely eliminated the need for random taxpayers to bear the sta-
dium's cost.6
3
5. Luxury Suites
Another form of revenue generating seating is the luxury suite.
The use of luxury suites in sports stadiums began in the 1880s with
the Chicago White Stockings. 64 Since that time, suites have become
the second largest revenue producers behind television contracts.
65
By the year 2000, suites in the four major sports ranged from an
average of $50,046 to $184,913 per season. 66 The suite is leased for
a specified period of time and allows the lessee to invite a particular
number of guests to each game for the length of the contractual
period.67 As with naming rights and club seating, luxury box pro-
ceeds are divided by using a number of different methods based on
the team's specific circumstances.
68
6. Concessions
Concession rights are "rights transferred to a concessionaire
for the sale and dispensing of food, snacks, refreshments, alcoholic
and non-alcoholic beverage, merchandise, souvenirs, clothing, nov-
elties, publications, and other articles in the stadium or arena, pur-
suant to a concession agreement."69 These agreements typically set
61. See id. at 295 (explaining fans' view of PSLs as way to become involved and
get something in return for supporting their teams).
62. See id. at 293 (noting NFL's Carolina Panthers sold PSLs and luxury suites
with signed contract for next six to ten years valued at $113 million before stadium
opened).
63. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 293 (stating seat license revenue covered
majority of cost of stadium, leaving only $55 million for taxpayers).
64. See id. at 279 (describing first use of luxury suites in sports stadiums).
65. See id. (describing necessity of luxury suites for virtually all professional
sports).
66. The NFL average low is $50,046, while the NBA average high is $184,913.
Id. at 279-80.
67. See id. at 289 (describing possibilities offered to luxury suite owners and
users).
68. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 291-92 (listing methods of dividing pro-
ceeds from luxury suites as flat percentage-based sharing and scaled percentage).
For a further discussion of naming right packages, see supra notes 38-41 and ac-
companying text.
69. Id. at 349.
203STADIUM FINANCING20051
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up precise locations where the concessionaires may sell their prod-
ucts including stands, condiment areas, vending machines, clubs,
or cafeterias. 70 The facility owner's profits from these agreements
are usually based on a percentage of the sales of certain items
rather than on a percentage of total sales.71 The remainder is ei-
ther kept exclusively by the facility owner or split between the team
and facility.72
Another system used to address concessionaire revenue shar-
ing is concession slotting.73 Under this system, the concessionaire
is charged a one-time fee in exchange for a long-term contract to
provide concessionary services to the stadium.74 Concession slot-
ting is generally used to help defer stadium construction costs. 75
7. Parking Facilities
Sports stadiums generate a great deal of traffic. This creates
opportunities to produce revenue through parking. On average,
parking is the smallest revenue generator of any of the listed cate-
gories. 76 Because owners of preexisting parking lots are allowed to
keep all revenues from sporting events, the lessor and lessee are
deprived of any benefit.77 To solve this perceived problem, many
stadium owners have petitioned the city government to tax private
lots that are directly benefiting from sports stadiums.78
While parking receipts are not usually a major source of reve-
nue for a stadium, it is often an area about which both the sports
team and the stadium owners are amenable to negotiation. 79 When
the NFL's Philadelphia Eagles and MLB's Philadelphia Phillies left
Veterans Stadium in 2003 and 2004 respectively, the City of Phila-
70. See id. (explaining concession agreements grant exclusive rights only in
specific physical locations).
71. See id. (showing stadium owners take only 0-10% from restaurants and 35-
55% commission from concessions).
72. See id. at 351 (illustrating allocation of concession revenues).
73. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 351 (demonstrating another strategic ef-
fort lessors and lessees implement to increase concession revenues).
74. See id. (defining concession slotting).
75. See id. (explaining how concessionaires will contribute toward stadium
construction costs in exchange for extended contracts).
76. See id. at 328 (stating parking revenues are smallest among stadiums' main
economic generators).
77. See id. (describing how parking lease concerns can be dealt with during
negotiations).
78. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 329 (detailing solutions for reclaiming
parking revenues).
79. See id. (noting parking leases at first glance are not highly significant is-
sues during negotiations).
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delphia, as owner of the stadiums, renegotiated the terms of the
parking and concession agreement with both teams.80 This agree-
ment allows the teams, rather than the city, to control stadium park-
ing and demonstrates how parking provisions are often the subject
of negotiation and are used by a municipality to transfer revenue
generators and assorted liabilities to a team.
B. Other Rationales for the Increase in Stadium Construction
While the aforementioned revenue producing engines are ma-
jor catalysts in spurring the construction of new stadiums, owners
sometimes join with cities to construct new stadiums for other rea-
sons. Owners and cities come together to build new stadiums, for
example, in response to pressure from sports teams that threaten to
move to a new city or the need of a team to move from a multipur-
pose arena to a single sport facility.8 ' Either of these rationales can
motivate a city or stadium investor to fund a new arena.
City residents often feel a strong connection with their local
sports teams. This results in a general fear among politicians of
public outcry associated with a team leaving a particular city.
82
Sports franchises are a relatively rare commodity. The number of
cities capable of hosting a team far outnumber the total number of
professional teams. Because many team owners are not stadium
owners, they are able to threaten to move to a different city if it
appears as though this would provide greater financial opportu-
nity.83 The prospect of increased revenue streams or appreciation
in team value provides most owners with enough incentive to seri-
ously consider a move.8 4
80. See First Amendment to Lease Agreement, 2001, City of Philadelphia -
Philadelphia Auth. for Indus. Dev., Section 2(0), 11 (adding Subsection 8.03(i))(on file with author).
81. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 595 (opining ideal situation would be to
have rich owners pay for their own stadiums); see also Robinson, supra note 18, at
145-46 (describing factors which contribute to building new stadiums).
82. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 595 (noting owners' bargaining leverage
and how owners use public's demand for local sports teams to their advantage).
83. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 210 ("As long as the quantity of major
league teams remains less than the quantity of cities believing they can support a
team, cities will be pitted against each other in the business of franchise
enticement.").
84. Because team owners receive a large percentage of the stadium generated
income without any of the stadium related expenses, a new stadium and the in-
creased revenue it generally provides increases the value of sports teams. See id. at
188 (commenting on franchise appreciation and how almost all of professional
sport franchise owners gain profit through franchise appreciation).
20051
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This dilemma often forces the local or state government to ei-
ther spend public funds building the new stadium in order to keep
the team, or refuse, and risk losing the team to another city.8 5 The
power of the team owner to arbitrarily move the team to a new loca-
tion has grown over time.86 As this power grows, the team owners
can apply more pressure on the cities.8 7 This has forced many poli-
ticians to feel obligated to spend public money on new stadiums or
risk becoming known as the person who "lost" the local sports
franchise.
The benefits of single sport stadiums to both stadium owners
and patrons are another factor in the push to build new facilities.
In the 1970s and 1980s, multi-purpose stadiums were built for pur-
poses of practicality.88 Today, sports fans prefer the enhanced sight
lines and stadium setup offered by single sport facilities over the
practicality of having only one stadium.89 This preference trans-
lates into increased ticket prices to reflect the benefit of the better
views and the overall enhancement of the experience. 90 At the
same time, team owners can focus on the emerging, and now vital,
corporate clientele in the new single-purpose stadiums.9 1 Between
the new revenue generators, the pressure from teams, and the need
for more sport specific stadiums, public officials, stadium investors,
and team owners have significant motivation to construct new
arenas.
85. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 595 (expressing how public demand and
outcry for local sports teams can affect local government spending).
86. Originally, the individual sports leagues placed restrictions on team move-
ment by requiring a supermajority of team owners to allow franchise relocation.
The Ninth Circnit Court of Appeals, however, ruled that because the teams in the
league were sufficiently independent from each other, the case warranted rule of
reason analysis under antitrust law. Under a rule of reason analysis, the court
found that a jury could have determined that the rule requiring a supermajority
harmed competiton among the teams. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL,
726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting teams much more leeway in their
determinations to relocate).
87. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 210 (describing cities' position as "Pris-
oner's Dilemma" when attempting to hold or attract local sports team).
88. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 146 (reporting multi-purpose stadiums as
most desirable during this time period).
89. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 184 ("The advent of the single-purpose
stadium allows a football team to have an ideal 70,000-seat stadium, and a baseball
team to seat an ideal 45,000 spectators.").
90. See id. (describing how single purpose stadiums translate optimal seating
into higher revenues).
91. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 145-46 ("Proximity to this core clientele
has become a new priority.").
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III. BRIEF HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCING
While the spike in sports stadium construction in the last dec-
ade has sparked the debate over public finance, the use of local
debt to finance public facilities is not a new concept. The history of
funding for local public facilities began in the early 1800s and ex-
panded through the middle of the 1960s.9 2 During this one hun-
dred and sixty-year period, stadiums were funded by a mixture of
private and public funding. While private funding remained con-
stant over the last two centuries, the history of municipal financing
is much more complex and has undergone far more changes.
93
This Section discusses the origins of general obligation bonds, their
transformation into tax-free revenue bonds, and the eventual regu-
lations placed on tax-exempt bonds by the federal government.
The Section concludes with a review of the practical effect federal
legislation had on actual construction financing.
A. Construction Funding Prior to Federal Legislation
Municipal financing of public facilities has involved a number
of different financing options over time. In the past, general obli-
gation bonds ("GO bonds") were the most commonly used instru-
ments.94 The general taxing authority of the issuer paid these "full
faith and credit" bonds, but were not tied to any specific assets.
95
Once these bonds were issued, the government would repay them
through local tax increases. The use of government issued debt in
the form of GO bonds began in an attempt to support canal build-
ing in the early 1800s, but did not become popular until the rail-
road boom later that century.96 Local government officials used
bond financing to build railroad stations in their hometowns to en-
sure that the railroads would not bypass their communities.9 7 The
bonds' speculative nature resulted in much lower returns to the
community than if the government had invested the money in
other projects. These small returns prompted taxpayers to demand
92. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 176 (reviewing elemental history of munic-
ipal debt issuance).
93. See id. (detailing history of governmental lending to finance construction
of public facilities).
94. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 150 (stating history and practical applica-
tion of GO bonds).
95. See id.
96. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 176 (recounting when use of GO bonds
became more prevalent).
97. See id. (explaining early instances of government bond financing).
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restrictions on the issuance of GO bonds,98 after which many states
amended their constitutions to restrict or severely limit the use of
GO bonds.99
The limitations on GO bonds forced municipalities to find an-
other way to publicly finance projects without violating the newly
amended state constitutions. In the early 1960s, local and state gov-
ernments began issuing bonds that could be directly tied to either
an identifiable revenue source associated with the public facility or
to some other specifically defined revenue source.100 These reve-
nue-based debentures, known as revenue bonds, collect no taxes on
interest and have become very popular with investors. 101 With re-
spect to sports stadiums, a revenue bond can be connected to the
stadium revenues or by more general sources such as an increase in
sales tax or hotel occupancy tax.102 Revenue bonds do not require
a general voter referendum like GO bonds because general reve-
nues are not involved in the repayment of the debt.103 Although
revenue bonds provide numerous benefits, many have criticized the
loss of tax revenue flowing to the federal government due to the tax
exemption. 104
B. Regulations on the Public Funding of Sports Stadiums by the
Federal Legislature
Community members demanded legislative action when they
realized tax revenue was being lost on the tax-exempt bonds. Con-
gress' first response was to implement the Revenue and Expendi-
98. See id, at 177 (describing what caused legislatures to amend limitations on
issuances of GO bonds).
99. See, e.g., N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3(2). The NewJersey State Constitution
provides:
No county, city, borough, town, township or village shall hereafter give
any money or property, or loan its money or credit, to or in aid of anyindividual, association or corporation, or become security for, or be di-
rectly or indirectly the owner of, any stock or bonds of any association or
corporation.
Id.
100. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 150 (detailing incentive to use revenue
bonds as opposed to GO bonds because they do not require voter approval).
101. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 177-78 (revealing additional reasons why
revenue bonds have become more popular).
102. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 152 (elaborating on common financial
instruments used to fund sports facilities and mentioning increase in sales tax or
occupancy tax).
103. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 150 (explaining why voter referenda is
not required for approval of issuance of GO bonds).
104. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 178-79 n.16 (citing 1921 Treasury Secre-
tary Andrew Mellon as vocal critic and referring to his letter to Congress request-
ing "elimination of all tax-exempt bonds").
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ture Control Act of 1968 ("1968 Act"). The 1968 Act "designated
local bonds as taxable if more than 25% of the bond proceeds
[were] utilized by a nongovernmental entity in trade or business;
and debt service on more than 25% of the proceeds was secured by
property used in a trade or business."105 While the 1968 Act began
to limit the use of revenue bonds for certain facilities, others, in-
cluding sports stadiums, were exempted as inherently quasi-public
in nature.10 6 This meant that a construction project would still be
eligible for tax-exempt bonds even if the sports team used the facil-
ity more than 25% of the time and paid off more than 25% of the
debt with stadium revenues. This freedom allowed stadium build-
ers to continue constructing new stadiums throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. 10
7
The first restriction on the general exemption for sports stadi-
ums came with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which denied tax-
exempt financing for luxury boxes by prohibiting the use of bond
proceeds to acquire land, currently used properties, and other facil-
ities.108 The government's next major legislative step in limiting
the tax-exempt bonds for sports stadiums came with the 1986 Tax
Reform Act ("1986 Act"), which eliminated sports stadiums as facili-
ties qualified for federal tax subsidies. 10 9 As long as stadiums re-
mained non-exempt and bonds issued to finance the arena would
be taxable, they would remain less attractive to investors because of
higher costs reflecting higher costs of debt service. The only re-
maining option for stadium investors and municipal governments
was to develop a financing method that Congress would not con-
sider to be a private activity bond. This required a demonstration
that the construction financing would not fall within Section 141 of
the Internal Revenue Code, which states:
[A] bond is a private activity bond if the bond is issued as
part of an issue that meets the private business use test of
§ 141(b) (1) and the private security or payment test of
105. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
106. See id. (explaining tax-exempt financing for public purpose facilities).
107. See id. at 181 (noting development of new facilities and increased financ-
ing costs).
108. See Anoop K. Bhasin, Tax-Exempt Bond Financing of Sports Stadiums: Is the
Price Right?, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 183 (2000) (stating Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984 demonstrated Congress' attempt to slow "issuance of tax-exempt indus-
trial development bonds used for building sports stadiums").
109. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 182-83 (describing significant changes
1986 Act made in private-use bonds and public financing of stadiums, and com-
menting on irony that Senator Bill Bradley, former NBA star, helped author 1986
Act).
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§ 141(b) (2). The private business use test is met if more
than 10 percent of the proceeds of an issue are to be used
for any private business use. The private security or pay-
ment test is met if the payment of the principal of, or the
interest on, more than 10 percent of the proceeds of an
issue is directly or indirectly (1) secured by an interest in
property used or to be used for a private business use, (2)
secured by an interest in payments in respect of such
property, or (3) to be derived from payments, whether or
not to the issuer, in respect of property, or borrowed
money, used or to be used for a private business use.110
This Section provides a two-part test for determining if a project is a
private activity bond. If a sports team uses its sports stadium more
then 10% of the time, this will satisfy the first prong of the test.
Therefore, in order for the government to classify a stadium as pub-
lic, stadium owners needed to remain within the confines of the
private security/payment test's requirements that no more than
10% of the stadium debt be secured by the revenues produced by
the stadium itself.11
The practical result of the 1986 Act was to change the method
of debt repayment. Municipal officials and stadium owners struc-
tured their debt repayment so that revenue streams from the actual
stadium accounted for less than 10% of the total repayment, while
the public was responsible for the remaining 90%.112 This financ-
ing plan forced the federal government to recognize a stadium con-
struction project as a public facility and consequently permit tax-
exempt bond financing. In order to reach the 90% public funding
level, municipal governments have employed techniques including
110. Rev. Rul. 03-116, 2003-46 I.R.B. 1083, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/rr-03-116.pdf.
111. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 152 (explaining requirement stadium
owners have had to meet in order to classify stadium as public).
112. See id. at 153-54 (explaining stadium debt payment financing).
[Vol. 12: p. 195
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol12/iss2/1
STADIUM FINANCING
increasing the sales tax, 1 13 tourist tax,1 14 sin taxes,'1 5 and imple-
menting a tax on lottery proceeds.'
1 6
Attempts by Congress to alter stadium financing have resulted
in a fundamental shift in the methods employed by prospective sta-
dium owners to finance new facilities. This shift has resulted in a
great deal of public debate over the fairness and equity of leaving
90% of the financial burden for a stadium on community residents,
most of whom may not directly benefit from its construction.
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCING ALTERNATIVES
While there are many incentives to build a new stadium, the
big question remains: who should pay for them? Historically, 78%
of a stadium's costs have been publicly financed.11 7 After the Inter-
nal Revenue Code changes in 1986, the burden began to slowly
shift over to the private sector, resulting in a split of 57% public and
43% private financing.118 According to one commentator, this
trend will continue to even out in the early part of the twenty-first
century.119 Regardless of the distribution of burden, the debate
over the increase in stadium construction continues.
A. Benefits of Having a Publicly Funded Sports Stadium
Proponents of publicly funded sports stadiums argue that
sports complexes provide numerous benefits to the entire commu-
nity, and therefore, the community should help fund the arena's
113. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 194 (describing how Arlington, Texas
successfully raised close to $135 million for Ballpark at Arlington through local
sales tax increase of 0.5 % with intention of equally affecting local community and
nonresidents who came to visit stadium).
114. See id. at 195-96 (stating portion of debt service for Chicago White Sox's
stadium, Comiskey Park II, was paid for by two percent City of Chicago hotel tax,
which was popular among local community because majority of tax was paid for by
nonresidents who came to see baseball game).
115. See id. at 196 (detailing tax, which added 4.5 cents to cost of cigarettes
carton, $3 per gallon of liquor, and 32 cents to cost of case of beer, paid for por-
tions ofJacobs Field, home of Cleveland Indians, and Gund Arena, home of Cleve-
land Cavaliers).
116. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 586 (stating Maryland took percentage
of state lottery proceeds to fund new stadium to entice Cleveland Browns' owner to
move team to Baltimore).
117. See Influx of Stadiums, supra note 2, at 16 (referencing statement by Don-
ald J. Longeran, vice president of Legg Mason Real Estate Services, in
Philadelphia).
118. See id. (reviewing decrease in public-private stadium financing percent-
age from initially 78% public, then 57%, and predicting 54% public after 2000).
119. See id. at 12 (identifying Longeran as commentator and discussing how
he spoke regarding stadium updates at International Association of Assembly Man-
agers conference in Philadelphia on Aug. 1-5, 1997).
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construction. 120 These benefits include a direct financial contribu-
tion to the area, the ability to revitalize dying communities, and the
addition of a mechanism to attract new corporations. 12 1 Some the-
orists even argue that without public funding stadiums would never
be built.12 2
The primary rationale for public funding of sports stadiums is
that the stadiums provide benefits to the community. According to
one commentator, "for each $1 spent on pro sports, an additional
$1.75 is created in the economy; for each $1 spent on pro sports,
household income rises an additional 17 cents; and for each $1 mil-
lion spent on pro sports, 76jobs are created."123 Most of these ben-
efits are derived from individuals who come into town for games
and spend money that otherwise would have been spent else-
where. 124 Sectors that see a distinct boost in revenue include tour-
ism, hotel occupancy, charitable donations, and overall increased
consumption. 125 The increased private and public consumption
promoted by the stadium extends into the area as a whole whether
the local residents attend games or not.12 6 Thus, the argument
goes, when a stadium is constructed, everyone in the community
benefits.
Another cited benefit of public funding to the local commu-
nity is that new corporations tend to migrate to areas where teams
are located.' 27 Corporations seek advantages in hiring the best and
the brightest as competition for qualified employees tightens. Hav-
ing a professional sports team in the area provides one more amen-
120. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 207 (stating "there may be enough
noneconomic benefits flowing from a new stadium to warrant the contribution of
limited public financing").
121. See id. at 207-08 (noting benefits of publicly funded sports stadiums).
122. Most stadiums today cost a minimum of $200 million to build. See id. at
186 (noting new stadium for Baltimore Ravens cost $200 million). This would
result in a price increase of $30-40 million.
123. Influx of Stadiums, supra note 2, at 12.
124. See id. at 16 (detailing benefits that are derived by communities from
monies spent on sporting events and specifically using Camden Yards in Baltimore,
Maryland as example).
125. See Bhasin, supra note 108, at 205 (enumerating these specific industries
as demonstrations of stadiums' economic benefits).
126. See id. (explaining flow of benefits from increased goods consumption to
surrounding areas, including non-quantifiable factors such as urban redevelop-
ment which occurred in Baltimore and Cleveland).
127. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 208 (stadiums lure other "business to
locate within the urban sprawl").
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ity the company can provide for potential employees.1 28 In fact,
certain cities view the acquisition of a major sports franchise as no-
tice to the world of its arrival as a major city. 129
At the same time, new stadiums allow a community to bring in
special events, including the possibility of the Super Bowl or the
Olympics. These events attract tourists from across the country,
which in turn, provide a benefit to the local economy.130 While
there is some argument over whether regular season sports games
bring in any real positive economic improvement, the benefit of
special events like the Super Bowl or the NCAA Final Four is
undeniable.131
Stadiums also have the ability to help revitalize dying commu-
nities. Sports teams can provide a common focus for the people of
an area that tends to improve community spirit.13 2 This new com-
mon interest can bring a sense of pride back to a community. For
example, Arizona's Bank One Ballpark renewed communal vigor
and helped spark a re-growth of Phoenix's downtown area.1 33 Simi-
larly, the development of Cleveland's new stadiums (part of the
Gateway Project) helped the city escape some of the urban blight
that had plagued the area.134 While not all stadiums can com-
pletely transform their surroundings into vibrant industrial zones,
with foresight and planning, they can be a positive step in
reconstruction.
Several other arguments favoring public funding for sports sta-
diums include a public purpose argument and a financial require-
ment argument. According to some theorists, because taxpayers
128. See id. ("[T]he real trophy for any city remains the procurement of tradi-
tional large corporate concerns, which seek to offer employees an enhanced qual-
ity of life in a tight labor market.").
129. See id. (opining sports facilities and teams are one piece of desirable
market).
130. See id. at 205 (reporting economic impact of Super Bowl on host cities
from 1996 - 2001 ranged from $295 million to $396 million). Many stadiums,
including Houston's new Reliant Stadium and Detroit's Ford Field, are designed
specifically to place the cities in the rotation of cities hosting the Super Bowl. See
id. (stating how NFL owners emphasize new stadiums in selection process for
Super Bowl).
131. See id. at 204-05 (exemplifying economists' agreement over economic
benefit of Super Bowl, but disagreement as to exact quantity of economic benefit).
132. See Bhasin, supra note 108, at 206 (specifying community spirit as one of
non-quantifiable benefits produced by having sports teams).
133. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 207-08 (illustrating revival in Phoenix
from previously desolate zone to place where people "congregate on nights and
weekends").
134. See id. (describing positive effects of stadium construction upon sur-
rounding communities).
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would never spend money on services that would benefit non-tax-
payers, "it may be advantageous for the federal government, which
receives funds from all beneficiaries, to subsidize resident consump-
tion and thereby motivate local governmental units to provide an
economically efficient level of public facilities.' 13 5 In other words,
taxpayers would seldom vote to support a stadium if people from
other communities will benefit without paying. If the federal gov-
ernment did not provide some support for the arenas, they would
not be built. 136
Without the public support of tax-exempt bonds, it is estimated
that stadium construction costs would rise approximately 15-
20%. 1 3 7 Adding an additional 15-20% to the construction costs of
even the most inexpensive of modern stadiums could make them
cost prohibitive.1 38 Fewer new stadiums would result in the loss of
the increased revenue produced by new sports complexes. Ulti-
mately, it could be argued that this is a loss for society as a whole.
B. Problems Presented by Public Financing
Many people are not convinced by the arguments in favor of
public financing and cite contrary statistics that show these benefits
to be illusory. These individuals argue that while benefits to the
community may exist, the returns are never as promising as plan-
ners expect and many communities are left with unpaid costs. 139
Further, they argue that any money brought in by the stadium
would flow into the community anyway under the substitution ef-
fect, and that any money spent on the stadium could have been
spent on other equally worthy projects.140 Finally, opponents also
argue that stadiums are not efficient at producing new jobs, that
those who pay taxes to support the stadium often cannot afford to
go to games, and that the alternative taxing methods unfairly in-
hibit established community programs such as the lottery. 14  Like
135. Id. at 180.
136. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 596 (noting problems that would result
if federal government did not provide support for arenas).
137. See id. (describing cost increase if stadium construction was not subsi-
dized by tax exemptions).
138. See id. (noting any increases in stadium construction costs would have
constituted substantial financial burden).
139. See id. at 589 (noting congressional study showing stadium projects have
no discernable economic impact).
140. See id. ("Economists argue that most of the money spent on professional
sports would be spent anyway, even if a team didn't exist within the community.").
141. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 590-94 (discussing impact of stadiums
on employment opportunities).
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the arguments presented in favor of public financing, some of these
arguments appear to have merit.
Some studies indicate that the stadium's actual benefit to the
community may be very small.1 42 In fact, some studies have shown
that a stadium may have no impact whatsoever on the local commu-
nity.143 Opponents therefore conclude that a majority of the
money generated from the stadium represents disposable income
that would have been spent elsewhere in the community had the
stadium not been there. 44 This "substitution effect" is based on
the idea that most individuals have a certain amount of disposable
income that they are willing to spend. 145 Whether or not the
money is spent on sporting events is irrelevant because the money
will be spent on other items. 146 Similarly, the money that went into
funding the stadium has an opportunity cost. If the money had not
been spent on the stadium it could presumably have been used else-
where to promote other forms of business, entertainment, or public
good. 147
Critics are also quick to point out that many of the stadiums'
benefits do not trickle down to the community or are so short-lived
that they provide little benefit. Often a majority of the financial
revenues generated by a stadium goes to the owners, players, and
those who build and supply the stadium.' 48 At the same time, the
promise of new jobs rarely comes to fruition, and most of the jobs
created by stadiums are short-term construction jobs and rarely lead
to full time positions.
49
142. See id. at 588 (noting critics point out lack of benefits to community from
stadium construction). C"
143. See, e.g., id. at 589 ("A recent study conducted by the Congressional Re-
search Service analyzed 30 stadium projects, concluding that 27 of these projects
had no discernible economic impact on the community, while the other 3 projects
actually had a negative effect on the community.").
144. See id. (noting Mark Rosentraub estimated between 12-34 percent of
money generated from a sports stadium signifies real gain and rest represents dis-
posable income).
145. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 202 (explaining each person budgets
money for leisure activities).
146. See id. at 202-03 (noting money not spent on one luxury item will be
spent on another).
147. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 157 (describing how taxpayers' money
used to finance stadium could be used elsewhere).
148. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 189 (noting profits from stadiums stay
within reach of few individuals).
149. See id. at 206 (noting empirical evidence denies that stadiums are effec-
tive public method for job growth). In a study done in Maryland in preparation
for the construction of a stadium for an NFL team in Baltimore, public reports
estimated that a new stadium would create 1,394 full time jobs at a cost of $127,000
20051
21
Mayer: Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We Ar
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
216 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Finally, opponents argue that individuals who are taxed to
make up for the federal contributions to the stadium rarely benefit
directly from the stadium.1 50 The largest factor contributing to this
problem is the increase of ticket prices. 151 Between the general rise
in prices and the increasing frequency of the use of personal seat
licenses, many individuals find that they are no longer able to af-
ford tickets.152 The tendency of corporations to buy large numbers
of tickets has added to the problem. In many stadiums today, single
game tickets are rarely available, and when they are, the tickets are
seldom below the upper deck. 153
The stadium funding methods employed by the municipal gov-
ernment can also present problems to the community. As discussed
above, a common complaint about exempting stadium-financing
bonds from taxes is resulting revenue loss to the city. 1 5 4 Yet, this is
not the only local loss presented by public stadium financing. After
1986, the government shifted to alternative forms of financing and
began to tax, among other things, items related to tourism and lot-
teries. 15 5 The government's imposition of taxes to increase the cost
of lottery tickets or hotel and car rental rates resulted in a decline
in the number of people playing the lottery or traveling to the city.
By increasing the cost of participating in these industries, the gov-
ernment effectively reduced the revenue that each produced,
thereby negatively affecting any program that had previously re-
ceived funding from lottery proceeds or any company associated
with tourism.' 56 These increases in taxes are more defensible if
they are approved in a general election. There are multiple cases,
however, where the electorate vetoed a proposed increase in sales
per job, while at the same time Maryland's Sunny Day Fund for economic develop-
ment had created 5,200 jobs at a cost of $6,250 per job. Id.
150. See id. at 193 (stating "the taxpayers who bear the greatest burden of
payment and finance, as a group, do not enjoy a proportionate share of the associ-
ated benefits.").
151. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 156 (noting "average fan" is unable to
take advantage of entertainment because of ticket prices).
152. The average cost for a family of four to attend a baseball game is over
$150. Id.
153. See id. (noting "[a] ccess to professional sporting events is ... financially
problematic for the 'average fan"').
154. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 596 (explaining how tax-exempt debt
financing exacerbates financial burden on citizens and municipality).
155. See id. at 597 (listing alternate tax income used to finance construction
brought upon by Tax Reform Act of 1986).
156. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 195-97 (describing programs that benefit
from tax and demonstrating how they were allocated by tax law).
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taxes or similar public financing package and the government
found an alternative means to circumvent the vote. 157
Several of the arguments presented above, however, are not
arguments limited to the financing of sports stadiums. While it is
true that the government could have used the revenue it gave up
through tax-free bonds elsewhere, the same could be said of many
governmental programs that target less than the entire population.
For example, any time a local government lowers corporate tax
rates to attract new businesses into the area, the same opportunity
cost exists.' 58 These corporate tax benefits reduce the potential
revenue for the city in the hope that the corporation will provide a
boost to the local economy. Just as with sports stadiums, it is never
clear that the new corporations that enter the community will pro-
vide an actual benefit to the community at large, or whether that
money goes to private individuals. As long as cities continue to pro-
vide such opportunities to new businesses, it is unclear why the
same benefit should not be given to new sports stadiums with the
similar potential.
At the same time, both sides cite "friendly" statistics that tend
to bolster their claims. For instance, Lonergan argues that money
spent on sports stadiums result in a 175% return for the commu-
nity.159 At the same time, congressional research services have
found that many stadiums produce little to no benefit for the com-
munity.1 60 While these two arguments contradict one another,
both can be true if one examines an individual stadium rather than
all sports stadiums in aggregate. Obviously, there is a greater
chance of community benefit provided by a stadium built in a cen-
tral, easily accessible location as a part of a greater development
plan than one built in isolation, outside the city limits. The resul-
tant effect appears to be a need for more reliance on the context of
the stadium development rather than how it is financed.
157. Voters rejected a 0.5 cent sales tax increase to support construction of
Pittsburgh's PNC Park. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 161 (noting rejection of
referendum). Subsequently, an alternative package was constructed that did not
require a vote, but still required public funding. See id. (describing new referen-
dum). A similar situation resulted after voters rejected a public financing package
for Seattle's Safeco Field. See id. (chronicling similar result in Seattle's scenario).
158. See id. at 157-58 (indicating opportunity costs from corporate tax breaks
are not exclusive to financing sports stadiums).
159. See Influx of Stadiums, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that for each $100 spent
on professional sports, $1.75 is injected into economy).
160. See Senkiewicz, supra note 16, at 589 (detailing study that found that of
thirty stadiums tested, three had noticeable negative impact on surrounding
communities).
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In the end, the amount of benefit that a stadium will provide to
a community has as much to do with how well the stadium is
planned as the method of financing used for its construction. Sta-
diums built as part of a larger construction plan for the area are far
more likely to generate revenue for the community than one built
with the hope that the stadium alone will bring in other business.
V. CURRENT PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE FINANCING DISPLAYED IN THE
TRANSACTIONS OF PAUL ALLEN AND THE OREGON
ARENA CORPORATION
Opponents of public funding of sports stadiums often argue
that stadiums should be privately funded because the majority of
the benefit flowing from the stadium stays with the franchise and
stadium owners. As the bankruptcy of the Oregon Arena Corpora-
tion ("OAC") demonstrates, however, private financing of a sta-
dium has its own problems. The ramifications of this bankruptcy
case will not only affect future attempts at private funding, but also
the present community in the Rose Quarter that was meant to sur-
round the Rose Garden. The following Section reviews the history
and implications of the OAC's current bankruptcy proceedings and
what it means for private financing of sports stadiums.
A. Background of the Oregon Arena Corporation
In June of 1991, the OAC was formed with an equity contribu-
tion from Paul G. Allen in the amount of $48 million. 161 The cor-
poration's purpose was to oversee the design, construction, and
operation of the Rose Garden and Rose Quarter, the district in
Portland surrounding its stadium. 162 The OAC gained control of
the Garden Garage, the Annex Building, and a ground lease with
the City of Portland as a part of its agreement to redevelop the Rose
Quarter.163 In 1995, the OAC finished construction of the Rose
Garden, four years after the corporation organized, and began
planning for the development of the surrounding community.164
161. See Rose Quarter: Timeline of Events, at http://web.archive.org/web/
20040307211954/http://www.rosequarter.com/ArDisplay.asp?ID=40938 (last vis-
ited Mar. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Timeline of Events]; see also First Amended Disclo-
sure Statement at 14, In re Or. Arena Corp. (No. 04-31605-elpll) (Bankr. D. Or.
May 18, 2000) [hereinafter First Amended Disclosure Statement].
162. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 14-16 (detailing
business of debtor and purpose of incorporation).
163. This ground lease excludes an approximate acre parcel, which is owned
in fee by OAC. See id. at 14.
164. See id. at 14-15 (discussing funding plans for arena); see also Rose Garden,
at http://www.sfo.com/-csuppes/NBA/PortlandTrailBlazers/index.htm (last vis-
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In contrast to most modern stadiums, the Rose Garden was al-
most completely funded through private investment.1 65 The city's
total contribution amounted to $34.5 million for renovations to the
Memorial Coliseum, construction of two adjacent parking struc-
tures, and the completion of various infrastructure elements re-
quired to support the complex. 166 The rest of the money came
from Allen's personal contribution of $46 million, $16 million in
bank loans, $10 million from bond interest, and the remaining
$155 million from private notes. 167 This was the first time a stadium
owner had used this type of financing to construct a sports stadium.
In the past, this method had been used mostly to finance plants,
factories and other large enterprises.1 68
Construction was strategically planned to be as cost effective as
possible. 169 The OAC built the stadium to allow for a variety of
different sporting events, including professional hockey, soccer,
track, and concerts, but the stadium is predominantly used by the
NBA Portland Trailblazers. 170 The arena is also designed to house
a full contingency of revenue producing engines, including luxury
suites, club seats, concessionaires, and advertising.171 These fea-
ited Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Rose Garden] (outlining specifications of Rose Gar-
den and Rose Quarter).
165. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 14 (describing
Rose Garden financing package).
166. See id. (illustrating financing for all components of Rose Quarter); see also
Rose Garden, supra note 164 (listing specifications of Rose Garden's surrounding
elements).
167. Rose Garden woes may wilt arena financings, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Mar. 12,
2004 [hereinafter Rose Garden Woes] (stating private bonds were predominantly
from private pension plan), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/sto-
ries/2004/03/15/tidbitsl.html?GP=OTC-MJ1752087487.
168. See id. (noting borrowing from pension funds was new concept in sta-
dium financing).
169. See Construction Recycling Cuts Arena Project Costs, at http://
www.sustainableportland.org/energy-OregonArena.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,
2005) (stating OAC was awarded 1994 Businesses for an Environmentally Sustaina-
ble Tomorrow Waste Management Award for reducing cost of construction by
around $150,000 through recycling construction and demolition waste).
170. See Rose Garden, supra note 164 (listing variety of events and uses of Rose
Garden).
171. See Rose Garden Arena: Home of the Portland Trailblazers boosts advertising in-
ventory and revenue, at http://www.clarityvisual.com/pdfs/success/Rose-
GardenArena.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) (showing signage in stadium is state
of art with full motion advertising); see also First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra
note 161, at 14 (describing revenue producing engines). The deal between the
Noteholders, OAC, and the Trailblazers Organization designated that ten percent
of stadium's gross ticket revenues would go to OAC as rent, while all of the money
from suite tickets and preferred seating tickets would be deposited directly into
accounts held by Noteholders. See id. at 16.
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tures combined to draw over 2.5 million people for various events
in the Rose Garden's first full year of operation. 72
Paul Allen had garnered so much respect through his dealings
with Microsoft and the OAC that the City of Portland sought his
help in building up the rest of the area surrounding the Rose Gar-
den. 173 Initially, the OAC was selected to guide the redevelopment
of the Rose Quarter. 174 Then, when the Memorial Coliseum was
fighting to prevent demolition, the city transferred planning con-
trol of the building to the OAC in a Memorandum of Understand-
ing, directing them to produce a development plan.1 75
B. OAC Bankruptcy
The Chapter 11 filing for OAC did not occur overnight. The
first signs of trouble appeared in 1999, when Paul Allen personally
provided $10.285 million to keep the OAC from defaulting. 176
Problems progressed for the Rose Garden when, in 2002, interest
rates were lowered and Allen began to seek to restructure the terms
of the OAC's deal with its bondholders. 77 He spent over a year
trying to renegotiate the $192 million still owed to the note-holders
through 2020.178 OAC President Steve Patterson argued that the
stadium's current payments are "2-1/2 times higher than the big-
gest payments of any other arena with a single professional sports
tenant.' 79 The decision that the company was no longer able to
172. See Timeline of Events, supra note 161 (discussing revenue produced by
various forums in Rose Garden's first year).
173. See Paul M. Falsetto, Memorial Coliseum in a Fight for its Life, HisToRIc PRES-
ERVATION N.W., at http://www.hp-nw.com/sosmemorial.htm (May 12, 2004) (de-
tailing Paul Allen's role in development of Rose Garden).
174. See Jim Redden & Kristina Brenneman, Rose Quarter changes on hold?,
PORTLAND TRIB., Mar. 2, 2004 (illustrating early revitalization efforts of Rose Gar-
den), available at http://www.porlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=23310.
175. See Falsetto, supra note 173 (detailing Portland's attempt to oversee revi-
talization surrounding area development).
176. See Timeline of Events, supra note 161; see also First Amended Disclosure State-
ment, supra note 161, at 16 (recalling Paul Allen's personal subsidy of OAC's
debts).
177. See Timeline of Events, supra note 161 (noting Allen's attempts to restruc-
ture deal).
178. See Associated Press, Billionaire Allen likely loses Rose Garden, MAIL TRiB.,
May 20, 2004 [hereinafter Billionaire Allen] (stating one aspect of negotiations
would have had Allen form new corporation that would have bought all assets
from OAC for $89 million, but note-holders rejected offer), available at http://
www.mailtribune.com/archive/2004/0520/biz/stories/O1 biz.htm.
179. Brent Walth & Ted Sickinger, Game's Over, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 7,
2004, at F01.
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service long-term debt came in early 2003, at which time it began
negotiations with creditors.180
On February 27, 2004, the OAC filed for Chapter 11 protection
in an attempt to restructure its debt and continue operations as
total losses for the stadium approach $20 million over the last nine
years.18 1 After Allen failed to find an equitable restructuring agree-
ment with the note holders, he sought permission from the court to
turn the stadium over to them. 182
In January of 2005, the creditors took ownership of all of the
assets of the OAC - including the Rose Garden.183 According to
published reports, the OAC not only lost control of its assets, but
Allen personally lost the $46 million he put into the construction of
the arena.18 4 Worse yet, the structure of the original financing has
had the unanticipated effect of stripping the Trailblazers of a quar-
ter of its revenue.18 5 Since they no longer have any interest in the
arena, the Trail Blazers are a mere tenant in the Rose Garden. As a
result, they will receive no revenue from the various revenue gener-
ators discussed above. 186 The Trailblazers' president has been
quoted as saying that the team's lease is "the worst lease in all of
professional sports."' 8 7
C. Rationale for the OAC's Chapter 11 Filing
A number of different factors led to the OAC's inability to con-
tinue paying off the Rose Garden's creditors. According to the
180. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 12-13 (demon-
strating that OAC has submitted plan which would turn over all of Class 1 assets of
company to creditors in satisfaction of claims).
181. See Timeline of Events, supra note 161 (describing debt totals in 2001 for
Rose Quarter); see also Walth & Sickinger, supra note 179, at F01 (detailing finan-
cial investments described in bankruptcy proceedings); First Amended Disclosure
Statement, supra note 161, at 16 (stating that debt is approximately $17.565
million).
182. See Billionaire Allen, supra note 178 (setting forth petition to hand over
ownership of Rose Garden); see also First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note
161, at 23 (stating that along with transfer of stadium to note-holders, OAC will
also transfer all executory contracts and unexpired leases).
183. See Todd Murphy, Paul Allen's Rose Garden: Under new ownership, PORT-
LAND TRIB., Jan. 4, 2005, available at www.portlandtribune.com/
archview.cgi?id=27773 (noting building was officially transferred to financial
companies).
184. See id.
185. See id. (stating transfer of Arena leave Trailblazers in position to get al-
most no revenue from stadium where they play).
186. See id. (acknowledging Trailblazers will receive no revenues from luxury
seats, special seating and revenue from advertising).
187. See id. (quoting Steve Patterson).
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bankruptcy disclosures, the main factors include continued busi-
ness losses, the general Portland economy, the discontinuation of
economic support from the Trailblazers, and the OAC's default on
current notes.' 8 8 According to Patterson, the Rose Garden had lost
money in all but two of the nine years it had been in operation.189
Projections for future stadium revenues are even worse. In plan-
ning for 2005, OAC projected negative cash flow over the next
three years to be in excess of $11 million. 190
There are many possible reasons for the Rose Garden's sharp
drop in revenues. One frequently cited explanation is the reduced
attendance at the Portland Trailblazers' games. 91 The Trailblaz-
ers' attendance has fallen by 20% over the past four years, while
attendance at other stadiums has remained relatively constant.19 2
Failure to sell out luxury seating is going to be an even larger prob-
lem for the Rose Garden in the future.1 93 Forty-six of the current
suite contracts, which represent a substantial portion of the total
number of suites, are going to expire at the end of this season. 19 4
Most suite owners have informed the team that they do not intend
to renew under the current system. 1 95 This would result in a loss of
$5.3 million in revenue for the stadium.' 9 6
Preferred seating has also presented a similar problem. In the
past several years, the franchise has only been able to sell 60% of its
preferred seating.19 7 Contracts on 56% of the preferred seating
that the team has sold will expire this year with many seat holders
stating that they will not return unless improvements are made to
188. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 17-21 (describing
aggregate effect of factors leading to Chapter 11 filing).
189. See id. at 16 (stating that in years 2000 and 2001 stadium turned profit of
only $800,000).
190. See id. at 7, 17 (anticipating negative cash flow from operations and
debts).
191. See id. at 17 (noting 25.5% decline in attendance in the fiscal year of
2003).
192. See Walth & Sickinger, supa note 179, at F01 (noting economic factors
contributing to financial woes of Oregon Arena Corporation).
193. See id. (noting lack of revenue from luxury suites whose leases were not
renewed); see also First Amended Disclosure Statement, supa note 161, at 18-19 (dis-
cussing problems with preferred seating "which represents fifteen percent (15%)
of its overall revenue in 2004").
194. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 18.
195. See id. (stating non-renewal of these leases or renewal at lower prices
could negatively impact cash flow even more).
196. See id. (stating that forty-two open suites represent more than $5.3 mil-
lion in revenue).
197. See id. at 18-19 (detailing preferred seating predicament which contrib-
uted to Chapter 11 filing).
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the stadium.1 98 Patterson argues that even if the stadium com-
pletely sold out, the note-holders' payment terms would still result
in a yearly loss. 199 The decrease in stadium attendance has cer-
tainly hurt the Rose Garden's revenue production.
The OAC's downfall demonstrates that private financing not
only has its own problems, but that it can also have a negative effect
on the public and surrounding community if the builders become
so over-burdened with debt that continued operations become im-
possible. It also highlights a second major problem with the private
financing of sports stadiums that may deter future investors.
20 0
During the negotiation process, one of the major sticking points
with the note holders was their demand that Allen personally guar-
antee any further loss. 20 1 Many companies or private investors
faced with the risk of having to make similar personal outlays or
guarantees will hesitate to privately finance a stadium. 20 2 Accord-
ing to the President of Boston-based Game Plan, Randy Vataha,
"[i] t will certainly give lenders reason to pause and at least look at
what additional things do you have to add to the documentation
mix, the deal structure mix . . "203 With this in mind, even if
private funding of a stadium were preferable to public funding, it is
not clear that such funding will be a possibility in the future.
D. The Effect of the OAC Bankruptcy on the Rose Quarter
In many cities, stadiums are relied upon to revive a declining
community. The Rose Quarter in Portland is such a district and is
not frequented unless there is a game being played at the Rose Gar-
den. 20 4 In order to change the area, the Portland Development
Commission hired design experts to plan out improvements. 20 5 Be-
cause the OAC owned the Rose Garden, the Entertainment Com-
plex, and was in charge of the redevelopment of the Rose Quarter,
198. See id. at 19 (furthering explanation of factors contributing to less
revenue).
199. See Walth & Sickinger, supra note 179, at FO (explaining consequences
of prior debt).
200. See id. (discussing OAC bankruptcy proceedings).
201. See Rose Garden Woes, supra note 167 (noting investors wanted Paul Allen
to underwrite stadium bonds).
202. See id. (describing lack of interest in debt underwriting by private individ-
uals or companies).
203. Id.
204. See Redden & Brenneman, supra note 174 (insinuating Rose Garden's
financial problems stem from lack of use).
205. See id. (outlining several proposals for constructing streets, housing, and
buildings).
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any planned renovation of the area was on hold while the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and ownership situation were being resolved.
The decline of the Rose Garden has had a direct negative im-
pact on the rest of the Rose Quarter. As revenues dropped at the
Rose Garden, the most popular restaurant, "Cucina! Cucina!" de-
faulted and became $150,000 in arrears to the OAC, who is unable
to find a suitable replacement tenant.20 6 The Memorial Coliseum
lost $226,000 last year and is projected to lose another $220,000 this
year.20 7 Non-sporting activities in the Rose Quarter have dropped
39% since 1997, with even larger drops in other types of shows. 208
Overall, Rose Quarter retail lease revenues have dropped from $1.3
million to $900,000 in one year. 209 As this case demonstrates, when
a stadium is no longer able to support itself and begins to lose cus-
tomers, it can negatively affect the entire community.
VI. THE FUTURE OF SPORTS STADIUM FINANCING LIES IN A
COMBINATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FUNDING
As long as stadiums continue to be built, debates will continue
over the most rational way to fund them. Allowing municipal gov-
ernments to fund stadiums with tax-exempt bonds reduces income
and results in a loss to the community that must be borne equally
by both those who do and do not use the stadium. Alternative
methods of public financing through sales tax increases or tourism
taxes place an increased burden on the community and take money
away from other programs that have an equal need for funding.
Either way, public financing lacks the ability to target only those
who will benefit from the stadium, and therefore, creates problems.
Private financing, on the other hand, places the entire burden
on several individuals who must be able to sustain the stadium
through ebbs and flows in public support of the team.210 Once the
stadium begins to experience problems, reviving it is much more
difficult because it requires those few individuals to invest more
206. See First Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 161, at 20-21 (noting gen-
eral .downward economic trend has affected Rose Quarter's retail tenants).
207. Id. at 21 (noting each year Memorial Coliseum continues its losses as
building's competitive situation worsens with expansion of competitive venues and
deterioration of its old infrastructure).
208. See id. at 19-20 (stating drops are also due in part to opening of major
amphitheater in Clark County, which is only sixteen miles away from Rose
Quarter).
209. See id. at 21 (noting further substantial reduction in retail value expected
over next year).
210. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 219-21 (emphasizing need for creative
private financing alternatives).
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money or risk bankruptcy for the stadium.211 Without revenue
coming in from the stadium, it is impossible to make necessary im-
provements or add new amenities, thus causing the stadium to sink
further into debt. Without outside support, the stadium and the
surrounding community face disaster.
Several legislators have attempted to completely eliminate tax-
free funding for sports stadiums. One recent example was Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who stated that he felt that tax-free fund-
ing for sports arenas "ultimately injures State and local govern-
ments and other issuers of tax-exempt bonds, that provides an
unintended Federal subsidy... and that contributes to the enrich-
ment of persons who need no Federal assistance whatsoever." 212 In
1996, Moynihan presented his Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issu-
ance Act ("STADIA"), which would change the 1986 Act into a one-
part test by eliminating the provision labeling construction projects
as public if they are funded by at least 90% of public money.
213
This would categorize any new project as a private activity if a pri-
vate organization used it more than 10% of the time.214 The obvi-
ous result is that no sports stadium would ever be able to receive
tax-free bond financing.
The problem with this legislation is that it threatens to prevent
the construction of any new stadiums. The loss of tax-exempt
bonds to support the stadium will raise the overall cost of construc-
tion and place a much higher burden on private investors. Even if
the intangible benefits that a stadium provides for a community are
ignored, the loss of new stadiums is detrimental to society from a
financial and social prospective.
New stadiums unquestionably increase revenue for teams.
Many critics of public funding argue that this increased revenue
flows only to the team and facility owners while the community sees
very little increase in revenue.2 15 This argument has several flaws,
not the least of which is that many studies have shown that stadiums
can in fact revive decaying communities. Furthermore, the in-
creased revenue from a new stadium represents increased income
to individuals as well as increased public consumption. Increased
211. For a discussion on the difficulties of reviving a stadium after using pri-
vate financing, see supra notes 161-203 and accompanying text.
212. Goodman, supra note 13, at 217 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (June 14,
1996) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D N.Y.)).
213. See id. (describing Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act).
214. See id. (noting effect of STADIA).
215. See id. at 174 ("Many claim that such an economic arrangement unjustly
diverts scarce community resources to privately owned sports franchises.").
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consumption has a positive economic benefit for society as a
whole. 216 By eliminating tax-exempt financing and thereby reduc-
ing the number of new stadiums constructed, a plan like Moyni-
han's would ultimately have a negative economic impact.
Moynihan's argument has another flaw. He ignores the fact
that the government regularly provides both direct and indirect
subsidies to various entities that arguably do not need them.217 It is
not entirely clear why sports stadiums are any less worthy of such
government "subsidies" than any of these other programs. 218
The result is that simply denying any public funding to sports
stadiums is not a feasible alternative. It is clear there are positive
and negative aspects to public and private financing, and in individ-
ual cases both sides present potentially valid points. The purpose of
this Article is not to imply that stadiums should be completely pub-
licly funded. The fact remains, however, that as long as stadiums
are designed as part of a well-planned community project, they can
have many positive public impacts.
As long as there are more cities suited to host professional
teams than teams available, stadium construction will continue.
The key to a stadium's success, however, may depend more upon
the context and planning that surrounds it, than its choice of fund-
ing. Successful stadium-community relationships are the result of
intense planning regarding the most effective way to incorporate
the new facility into the existing community. Whether the city
chooses to use public or private financing (or some combination
thereof), the return to the community will typically be positive if
the design and implementation of the stadium is properly planned.
216. See Bhasin, supra note 108, at 205 (citing benefits including increased
tourism, hotel occupancy, jobs in sports industry and other areas, and charitable
donations).
217. An argument could be made that programs, including farming subsidiza-
tion and corporate tax reduction among others, are all "unnecessary" government
subsidies that favor only certain members of a community.
218. See Goodman, supra note 13, at 196.
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